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AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY ON THE RELEVANCE AND SCOPE
OF NATIONALITY AS A COORDINATION DEVICE
OLGA STODDARD and ANDREAS LEIBBRANDT∗

In a period marked by extensive cross-national interactions, nationality may present
an important focal point that individuals coordinate on. This study uses an experimental
approach to study whether nationality serves as a coordination device. We let subjects
from Japan, Korea, and China play coordination games in which we vary information
about their partner. The results show that nationality serves as a coordination device
if common nationality is the only piece of information available to the subjects. The
strength of this device is nationality-dependent and diminishes when participants are
provided with additional information about their partner. We also find that subjects are
likely to coordinate on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium at about the same rate if the
partner has a different nationality than if nationality is unknown. (JEL C91, C92, Z1,
Z13)
I.

people tend to use a solution that seems relevant,
natural, or special to them, known as a focal
point (Schelling 1960; Crawford and Haller
1990; Mehta et al. 1994; Sugden 1995; Camerer
2003). Nationality may be such a focal point
and hence one may hypothesize that nationality serves as a coordination device and that
coordination is less likely to occur if interactions take place between partners from different
nationalities (Schelling 1960; Sugden 1986).
The existing body of literature provides
grounds for such a hypothesis. Efferson et al.
(2008), for example, suggest that coordination
among compatriots may be facilitated in strategic settings with multiple equilibria because of
in-group favoritism, particularly when trivial
groups evolve into cultural groups. Theoretically,
Chen and Chen (2011) use a group-contingent
social preference model to show that an induced
salient group identity can lead to higher in-group
coordination on the efficient high-effort equilibrium in the minimum-effort coordination games.
As nationality represents an important dimension
of individual identity, we expect nationality to
matter in coordination settings and conjecture
that individuals coordinate better when they

INTRODUCTION

The beginning of the new millennium has
been marked by increased social, economic,
technological, and cultural integration. These
phenomena, in turn, promote contact between
individuals from different countries and cultural backgrounds putting higher demands on
the coordination of actions.1 In this context,
it is important to understand if and how coordination depends on the cultural backgrounds
of the participating actors. One stylized fact
in the economic literature on coordination is
that in the absence of additional information,
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1. We use the term culture, cultural background, and
nationality interchangeably in this study. For a survey on the
different definitions for culture, consult, for example, Kroeber
and Kluckhorn (1952). Culture certainly has many meanings
and nationality is just one aspect of it, albeit an important
one. We use nationality as a proxy for culture and discuss
the strength of this proxy and other aspects of culture in the
conclusion.

ABBREVIATIONS
GPA: Grade Point Average
MIS: Miscoordination
PDE: Payoff-Dominant Equilibrium
RDE: Risk-Dominant Equilibrium
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interact with their compatriots as compared to
non-compatriots or as compared to subjects
whose nationality they do not know.
In this study, we use an experimental
approach to investigate whether and under which
conditions nationality serves as a coordination
device in coordination games with multiple equilibria (Crawford and Haller 1990; Cooper et al.
1990; Van Huyck et al. 1990; Crawford 1995).
We made use of the diverse student body at
the University of Hawaii and recruited an equal
amount of Japanese, Korean, and Chinese nationals. The subjects play simple stag-hunt coordination games with a payoff-dominant equilibrium
(PDE) and a risk-dominant equilibrium (RDE),
and interact both with their compatriots and with
participants from the other two countries. To test
for the robustness of the relevance of nationality
as a focal point, we provide subjects with different levels of information about their partner: (1)
no information, (2) information only about their
partner’s nationality (i.e., nationality is salient),
and (3) information about their partner’s nationality and some other presumably irrelevant characteristics such as hair color (i.e., we make nationality less salient). In addition, we observe the
subjects’ level of pro-sociality toward subjects
from other nationalities and compatriots in ultimatum and dictator games to investigate whether
potential differences in coordination are driven
by in-group favoritism (Tajfel and Turner 1979).
Our findings show that nationality can indeed
serve as a coordination device. Subjects are more
likely to try to coordinate on the PDE if common
nationality is salient as compared to if subjects
do not know the nationality of their partner. However, if nationality is non-salient, nationality does
not serve as a coordination device, that is, subjects are not more likely to try to coordinate on
the PDE if their partner has the same nationality. Moreover, we do not find that subjects are
less likely to try to coordinate on the PDE if their
partner has a different nationality as compared to
when the partner’s nationality is unknown.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first experimental study analyzing inter-cultural
coordination between different nationalities in
a systematic manner and inter-cultural behavior
where the salience of nationality is experimentally manipulated. Probably the closest related
study is that of Brandts and Cooper (2007)
who compare the behavior of subjects in the
United States and Spain and observe higher
levels of coordination in the United States. This
study, however, does not investigate coordination
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between subjects from different nationalities.
Related to our findings is also the study by
Crawford et al. (2008) in which the authors
find that miscoordination (MIS) increases if the
salience of focal points is reduced by minimally
changing payoff constellations, and Holm (2000)
who finds that information about gender affects
coordination in a battle-of-sexes game.
In addition, a closely related literature in social
psychology studies economic behavior in the
context of social identity theory and nationality
in particular. Examples include Kuwabara et al.
(2007) and Takshashi et al. (2008). Both studies
report the results of web-based laboratory experiments where individuals from two or three countries play a variant of the trust game online under
two experimental conditions—one in which the
partner’s nationality is known, and another in
which the partners remain anonymous. Similarly,
Yamagishi et al. (2005) had participants from
Japan and Australia play five rounds of Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, each time with a different partner, varying the extent of mutual knowledge of
the partners regarding each other’s nationality.
However, while these studies all use nationality in
their experimental conditions, they do not experimentally manipulate the salience of nationality,
as we do in our study.
Our study contributes not only to the literature on coordination games which are characterized by the existence of multiple Nash equilibria
(Crawford and Haller 1990; Cooper et al. 1990;
Van Huyck et al. 1990; Crawford 1995) but also
to the literature comparing behavior across cultures (Roth et al. 1991; Okada and Riedl 1999;
Anderson et al. 2000; Henrich 2000; Henrich
et al. 2001; Brandts et al. 2004), between cultures (Fershtman and Gneezy 2001; Buchan et al.
2006; Chuah et al. 2007; Bornhorst et al. 2008;
Kuwabara et al. 2007; Yamagishi et al. 2008),
and more generally to the literature on in- and
out-group behavior (Sherif et al. 1961; Tajfel and
Turner 1979; Kollock 1998; Eckel and Grossman 2005; Goette et al. 2006; Takshashi et al.
2008; Charness and Rustichini 2007; McLeish
and Oxoby 2007; Chen and Li 2009) which typically reports that individuals treat in-group members better than out-group members.
Most of these studies do not manipulate the
salience of group membership. Exceptions are
Eckel and Grossman (2005) and Charness and
Rustichini (2007), which create minimal groups
to study cooperation and increase group identity
by team goal attainment or passive audiences.
Consistent with our findings, these two studies
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point out that the saliency of group membership
affects behavior. In contrast to these studies, we
investigate coordination among natural groups of
people with different nationalities and decrease
group identity by providing subjects with different levels of information about their partners.
II.

HYPOTHESES

In this section, we present our research
hypotheses regarding subject behavior in coordination games with multiple equilibria as related
to nationality, as motivated by the theoretical
and empirical findings which we discuss in the
following section.
HYPOTHESIS 1: Nationality serves as a coordination device in coordination games with multiple equilibria.

This hypothesis implies that relative to a
condition where players have no information
about their partner’s nationality, information
about common nationality serves as a focal point
and enhances coordination between players.
Theoretically, this hypothesis is motivated by a
group-contingent social preference model (Chen
and Chen 2011) that shows that an induced
salient group identity can lead to higher in-group
coordination on the efficient high-effort equilibrium in the minimum effort coordination games.
We extend their analysis to natural group identity.
Furthermore, in order to explore not only if but
also under what conditions nationality serves as a
coordination device, we hypothesize that varying
the salience of information about nationality may
have an impact on the effectiveness of nationality as a coordination device. Empirical findings of Eckel and Grossman (2005) and Charness
and Rustichini (2007) point to the importance of
manipulating the salience of group membership
in minimal groups, and we expect that it is even
more important in natural groups.
HYPOTHESIS 1a: Nationality serves as a coordination device if nationality is salient.
HYPOTHESIS 1b: Nationality serves as a coordination device if nationality is non-salient.

These hypotheses imply that relative to having
no information about the partner’s nationality,
having either salient or non-salient information
about common nationality increases coordination
between players.

HYPOTHESIS 2: Coordination is more difficult
if subjects know that their partner has a different
nationality.

This hypothesis is motivated by Tajfel and
Turner’s (1979) theory of social identity and an
extensive empirical literature on in- and outgroup behavior (cited in the previous section),
which generally finds that subjects treat in-group
members better than the out-group. We therefore expect coordination to be less likely when
subjects know they are matched with a noncompatriot relative to when they are matched
with a compatriot.
Together, hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 2 form the
basis of our experimental design, which we
present in the next section.
III.

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

Our experiment consists of four parts: (1) a
short pre-experimental questionnaire to collect
the subjects’ demographic information, including
nationality; (2) instructions and control questions
for the games (the complete set of experimental
instructions and questionnaires is given in the
Appendix); (3) the games; and (4) a short postexperimental questionnaire before subjects are
paid privately.
All subjects first took part in three ultimatum games and three dictator games before they
played three coordination games. Each game was
presented to the subjects separately and they
received no information about the behavior of
other subjects or the outcomes of the games until
the end of the experiment. The roles remained the
same throughout the experiment, that is, a subject
who was assigned a role of a proposer in the ultimatum game, was also a proposer in the dictator
game. Players were randomly paid for one of the
three ultimatum games, one of the three dictator
games, and one of the three coordination games.
In addition, we used the perfect stranger matching, so no player knew the identity of his/her coplayer and no player was ever matched with the
same player twice. Therefore, there is no theoretical reason to believe that the behavior in the
coordination games is contaminated by the preceding games.2 By taking into consideration the
2. In principle, there could be order effects, that is, subjects may in general play a coordination game differently
after playing, for example, a dictator game. However, because
our main analysis compares treatments where the order was
identical, our treatment differences cannot be attributed to
order effects. We briefly examine relationships between ultimatum game, dictator game, and coordination game behavior
in Section III.
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FIGURE 1
Choice in Coordination Game Depending on Treatment and Match

Notes: S, salient treatment; NS, non-salient treatment.

behavior in the ultimatum and dictator game, we
can control for the possibility that the treatment
differences in the coordination game are driven
by some type of in-group favoritism.3
The three coordination games (as well as
the three ultimatum and dictator games) differ
according to the matching and were presented
to participants in random order. In one decision,
a subject was matched with a person from the
same nationality, and in the other two he/she
was matched with subjects from other nationalities than his/her own. The matching algorithm
is presented in Figure 1. The experiment was
programmed using Z-tree software (Fischbacher
2007).
3. The necessity to conduct multiple games in one session was motivated mainly by the unique subject pool in
this experiment. The nature of the experiment required an
equal number of subjects of three different nationalities to
be present in one session at a time. It would be extremely
difficult to find a sufficient number of participants from different nationalities if we had to avoid a multi-game design. Our
multi-game design was also motivated by the many recently
published experimental studies using multi-game designs (see
Appendix D).

There are three between-subject treatments in
this experiment which differ by the amount of
information subjects have about their matched
partners: control (treatment C), salient information about partner’s nationality (treatment S), and
non-salient information about partner’s nationality (treatment NS). In C, a subject receives no
information about his/her partner. In S, the only
piece of information a subject receives is the
nationality of his/her partner. In NS, a subject
receives information about the age, university status (freshman, sophomore, junior, senior, or graduate student), eye color, hair color, and nationality of his/her partner. No subject participated in
more than one treatment.
The coordination game we study is a symmetric two-person stag-hunt game in which the
subjects simultaneously choose either A or B.
The earnings are determined depending on their
choice and the choice of their match according to
the payoff matrix presented in Appendix B. For
example, if Participant 1 chooses A, then Participant 2 earns seven tokens if he/she chooses A
and one token if he/she chooses B. Each token
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is worth $1 if the game is chosen for payment.
Note that choice B is riskier for the subject as
he/she could either make one or nine tokens
depending on the choice of his/her match. By
contrast, choice A is less risky as it secures at
least seven tokens regardless of the other subject’s decision. There are two Nash equilibria in
this game: (A,A) which is the RDE, and (B,B)
which is the PDE. Charness (2000) studies this
game with the same parameter specifications.
In the ultimatum games, a proposer has to
decide how to divide ten tokens between him/her
and a responder. If the responder accepts, the
offer is implemented; however, if he/she rejects
both player types receive zero tokens. We implemented the strategy method for the responders,
that is, the responder had to determine his/her
minimal acceptable offer before he/she knew the
actual offer of the proposer. In the dictator games,
the proposer has also to decide how to divide ten
tokens between him/her and a responder but the
responder cannot reject the offer.
A total of seven sessions were conducted in
the UH Experimental Laboratory in April 2009
(two sessions for treatments C and NS each, three
sessions for treatment S).4 Sessions typically
included 18 participants: 6 Japanese, 6 Korean,
and 6 Chinese students. A total of 126 subjects participated in the experiment (42 Japanese,
38 Korean, 42 Chinese, and 4 other nationalities).5 These nationalities were chosen because
of their significant representation at the University of Hawaii as well as their close regional
ties. Choosing participants from the same region
allows reducing possible cross-regional factors
that may affect subjects’ behavior and potentially
contaminate the results of the experiment. One
challenge is that these participants may be less
representative for the population residing in the
respective countries and consist of those who
4. An extra session for the S treatment had to be conducted as a result of an insufficient number of Korean participants present at one of the previous sessions.
5. Subjects were recruited with campus flyers and email announcements. Interested individuals were asked to
fill out sociodemographic information as well as to report
their nationality. We invited only individuals who reported
to be Japanese, Korean, or Chinese. However, during the
experimental sessions four participants answered in the preexperimental questionnaire to be of another nationality (one
participant in NS and three participants in S). Accordingly,
in our analysis we exclude these participants and the participants that were matched with these in the S and NS treatments.
More precisely, we excluded from our analysis three observations in NS and nine observations in S. None of the subjects
analyzed in our results had a dual nationality. Upon entering
the laboratory, subjects were not allowed to talk to each other.

only weakly identify with their nationality. Thus,
we have made every possible effort to recruit subjects who still have strong ties to their nationalities and our sample consists of mainly students
who have not been abroad for a longer period
(55% of our subjects had been abroad for less
than 2 years) and still identify strongly with their
nationality (98.3% of the subjects reported to
strongly identify with their nationality).
Our subject pool has the following characteristics. Sixty-eight percent of the subjects are
female; 57% identify themselves very strongly
with their nationality, 41% somewhat strongly,
and 2% not at all. Fifty-five percent of the
subjects report to have a grade point average
(GPA) of 3 (=mean grade in their university
classes, out of 4), and 37% a GPA of 4. With
regard to the information subjects receive about
their partner in the NS treatment, we observe
that 55% have black and 44% brown eyes, 86%
have black and 13% brown hair. The mean
age is 25 years; 38% are graduate, 25% are
senior, 21% junior, and 16% sophomore and
freshman students. Each subject participated in
only one session. Sessions lasted approximately
45 minutes and the subjects earned on average
$13 ($5 show-up fee, plus their earnings from
the experimental sessions). Table 1 presents a
summary of the sessions.
IV.

RESULTS

We start this section with a brief overview
of behavior in the coordination, dictator, and
ultimatum games before we investigate whether
nationality serves as a coordination device. In
the coordination games, we find that overall the
risky alternative B was chosen 44.1% of the time
(156 out of 354). There are no significant differences in the mean probability to choose B
among nationalities. Japanese choose B with a
probability of .467, which is similar to Chinese
(.443; Fisher’s exact test, p = .797, two-sided)
and Koreans (.409; Fisher’s exact test, p = .427,
two-sided). We observe that 18.1% of the pairings achieve the PDE, 29.9% the RDE, and 52%
miscoordinate.
Table 2 summarizes the means of all three
treatments under the two different matchings
(same or different nationalities) for the coordination, ultimatum, and dictator games. In the
control treatment, we observe that 42.6% of
the subjects choose B in the coordination game
(Japanese: 47.2%, Chinese: 41.7%, and Korean:
38.9%). In the salient treatment, 45.8% choose B
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TABLE 1
Experimental Design (number of observations by treatment and matching)
Control
(no informaion about
the match)

Salient
(information about
nationality only)

Non-salient
(information about nationality
and other characteristics)

11
11
11
21
22
22
108

18
12
18
30
36
30
144

12
10
12
22
24
22
102

J–J
K–K
C–C
J–K
J–C
K–C
Total

Notes: J–K represents a matching in which a Japanese subject is paired with a Korean subject. J, Japanese; K, Korean; C,
Chinese.

TABLE 2
Behavior in Coordination, Ultimatum and Dictator Games (means, number of observations in
parentheses)
S-Treatment

Coordination (probability B)
Ultimatum (proposer offer)
Ultimatum (responder MAO)
Dictator (proposer offer)

NS-Treatment

C-Treatment

Non-compatriot

Compatriot

Non-compatriot

Compatriot

0.43
(108)
4.62
(53)
3.13
(53)
3.33
(54)

0.41
(96)
5.06
(48)
3.27
(48)
2.83
(48)

0.56
(48)
5.25
(24)
3.50
(24)
3.32
(25)

0.43
(68)
4.38
(32)
3.00
(33)
3.65
(34)

0.44
(34)
4.28
(18)
2.35
(17)
3.35
(17)

Notes: Bold numbers indicate statistically significant differences. MAO, minimum acceptable offer as stated by a responder
in ultimatum game.

(Japanese: 47.1%, Chinese: 41.2%, and Korean:
50%), and in the non-salient treatment 43.1%
(Japanese: 45.7%, Chinese: 51.4%, and Korean:
31.5%).
In the dictator game, the mean token amount
sent is 3.26 (treatment C = 3.33, S = 3.00, and
NS = 3.55). In the ultimatum game, the mean
token amount sent is 4.75 out of 10 (treatment C = 4.62, S = 5.12, and NS = 4.33) and the
mean minimum acceptable offer is 3.12 (treatment C = 3.13, S = 3.35, and NS = 2.78). The
mean individual behavior in the three coordination games is not significantly correlated to
the mean individual behavior in the three dictator games (r = .059, p = .654), the mean individual proposer behavior in the ultimatum games
(r = .194, p = .138) or the mean individual minimal acceptable offer in the ultimatum games
(r = .073, p = .574).
We now address the question of whether
nationality serves as a coordination device if
nationality is salient. We observe that 56.3% of
the subjects (27 out of 48) choose B in treatment S

if they know that their partner has the same
nationality. As shown in Figure 1, this percentage is considerably higher than the equivalent
percentage in the control treatment C (46 out of
108; 42.6%; p = .057, χ2 = 2.49, one-sided); that
is, subjects are approximately 33% more likely
to attempt to coordinate on the Pareto-efficient
outcome if they know that they are matched
with a compatriot. This finding is significant
at p = .025 after controlling for the subject’s
nationality, his/her level of identity with his/her
nationality, GPA, and gender (Table 3, model 1).
Identity and GPA predict positively the choice
to play B (p < .062). Model 1 also shows that
both Korean and Chinese students tend to be less
likely to choose B in treatment C, as compared
to the Japanese (p < .144).
Figure 2 illustrates that the strength of the
coordination device (i.e., the information that
the partner is a compatriot) is highly dependent
on nationality. We observe the probability that
subjects play B is the highest in the treatment
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TABLE 3
Choice of Pareto-dominant Equilibrium Action in Coordination Game Depending on Matching and
Covariates (Probit regression)
Model
Observations in
treatments
Compatriot?

(1)
C & S if paired
w/compatriot

(2)
C & NS if paired
w/compatriot

0.055**
(0.025)

0.001
(0.987)

Non-compatriot?
Identity
Female?
GPA
Subject is Korean?
Subject is Chinese?
Number of observations

0.207*
(0.062)
0.090
(0.434)
0.276***
(0.000)
−0.227
(0.126)
−0.233
(0.102)
154

0.074
(0.556)
0.097
(0.459)
0.121
(0.216)
−0.130
(0.394)
−0.085
(0.563)
142

(3)
C & S if paired
w/non-compatriot

(4)
C & NS if paired
w/non-compatriot

0.025
(0.448)
0.231**
(0.012)
0.029
(0.770)
0.091
(0.199)
−0.153
(0.224)
−0.171
(0.163)
200

−0.012
(0.912)
0.061
(0.588)
0.149
(0.213)
0.088
(0.345)
−0.190
(0.157)
−0.060
(0.655)
176

Notes: Coefficients are average marginal effects. p values in parentheses. Robust standard errors clustered on subject level.
Compatriot = 1 if subject is paired with compatriot, 0 otherwise. Non-compatriot = 1 if subject is paired with subject having a
different nationality, 0 otherwise. Subject is Korean/Chinese? 1 if yes, 0 otherwise. Female = 2 if subject is a female, 1 otherwise.
*p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01.

condition S-IN (treatment S, partner is compatriot) for all three nationalities. However, for
Japanese subjects salient information about the
partner being Japanese has very little impact on
the willingness to choose B as compared to having no information about the partner’s nationality in treatment C (50% vs. 47.2%, respectively).
By contrast, Korean subjects are more likely to
choose B when paired with another Korean in
treatment S than in C (66.7% vs. 38.9%; p = .047,
χ2 = 2.80, one-sided). Chinese subjects are more
likely to choose B when paired with a compatriot
in treatment S than in C, but this effect is not statistically significant (55.6% vs. 41.7%; p = .167,
χ2 = .93, one-sided).
Figure 3 provides an overview of the outcomes
in all treatments and distinguishes between the
PDE outcome, RDE outcome, and MIS. This
figure illustrates that the more pronounced willingness to coordinate on the PDE leads to more
payoff-dominant outcomes (7 out of 24 or 29.2%)
when matched with a compatriot in S than in C
(12 out of 54 or 22.2%). It also leads to less coordination on the RDE than in C (16.7% vs. 37.0%)
and when matched with a non-compatriot in S
(31.3%).
How can we explain these coordination game
results? Presumably, greater coordination in S
with a compatriot could be explained by either
in-group favoritism or the fact that nationality

serves as a coordination device. We explore subjects’ propensity to treat their compatriots better than non-compatriots by utilizing the results
from ultimatum and dictator games. Interestingly, we do not find that subjects behave consistently more pro-socially toward their compatriots in the ultimatum and dictator games in
our subject pool. For example, as reported in
Table 2, the mean transfer in the dictator game
to a compatriot in treatment S (3.32) is almost
identical to the mean transfers in treatment C
(3.33), and not statistically different from the
mean transfer to a non-compatriot in treatment
S (2.83).6 We find some differential treatment
in the ultimatum game on the side of the proposer: the mean offer in treatment S to a compatriot (5.25) is higher than the mean offer in treatment C (4.62, p = .069, Mann–Whitney, twosided); however, it is not statistically higher than
the mean offer to a non-compatriot in treatment S (5.06).7 On the side of the responder,
we find that the minimal acceptable offer is
6. Note also that if we only look at Koreans—in
whom the propensity to coordinate with a compatriot is most
pronounced—we also find no such statistical differences. In
the dictator game, Koreans even give more in treatment C
(3.73) than to compatriots in treatment S (3.17).
7. This finding is in line with the finding of Chuah et al.
(2007) who find that Malaysian Chinese subjects gave on
average higher offers in the ultimatum game to compatriots
as compared to subjects from the United Kingdom. Note that
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FIGURE 2
Choice of Pareto-Dominant Equilibrium Action Depending on Nationality and Treatment

Notes: C: control treatment, subject does not know nationality of partner; S-IN: Treatment S, subject is paired with compatriot;
S-OUT: Treatment S, subject is paired with partner from a different nationality; NS-IN: Treatment NS, subject is paired with
compatriot, NS-OUT: Treatment NS, subject is paired with partner from a different nationality.

higher with a compatriot in treatment S than
in C, but this difference is not statistically significant (3.5 vs. 3.13, p = .326, Mann–Whitney
test).
One possible explanation for the lack of ingroup favoritism in our subject pool may lie in
the dual nature of culture in this experiment.
While nationality certainly comprises one aspect
of culture, it does not represent the full extent
of it. Besides being nationals of three different countries, subjects in this experiment are all
students of the University of Hawaii and are
united by a university culture and their common
Asian heritage. As international students, they
may perceive each other as members of the same
group, rather than outsiders. This common culture may explain why we do not find significant
there are procedural differences between our and their study.
In particular, Chuah et al. conducted their experiments in
their subjects’ respective home countries (Malaysia or United
Kingdom) whereas we conducted our experiments outside the
subjects’ home countries.

in-group favoritism in the dictator and ultimatum
games.
The lack of in-group favoritism suggests that
our finding that compatriots are more willing to
coordinate on the PDE is not primarily driven
by a propensity—or a potential experimental
demand effect—to behave more pro-socially
toward compatriots.
FINDING 1a: Nationality serves as a coordination
device if nationality is salient: Subjects are more
likely to choose a payoff-dominant equilibrium action
if matched with a compatriot. The strength of this
coordination device, however, is highly nationalityspecific.

Next, we assess whether nationality continues
to serve as a coordination device if nationality
is non-salient. We observe that 44.1% (15 out of
34) subjects choose B if they play with someone
from the same nationality in treatment NS. This
percentage is not statistically different from the
percentage in the control treatment (42.6%). Note
also that none of the other pieces of information
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FIGURE 3
Outcomes in Coordination Game Depending on Treatment and Match

Notes: PDE, payoff-dominant equilibrium outcome with payoffs (9,9); RDE, risk-dominant equilibrium outcome with payoffs
(7,7); MIS, miscoordination outcome with payoffs (1,8) or (8,1). S, salient treatment; NS, non-salient treatment.

that we gave subjects about their partner in the NS
treatment (age, status, hair color, and eye color)
is significantly related to the choice of B (p > .33,
Spearman). Table 3, Model 2 shows that even
after controlling for our covariates, subjects are
not more likely to choose B when matched with
a compatriot in NS (p = .987).
In Figure 3, we observe a low fraction of
payoff-dominant outcomes in treatment NS when
paired with a compatriot (12.5%) and a high level
of MIS on the outcomes ((8,1) (1,8)), which is
even somewhat higher than in treatment C (64.7%
in NS compared to 40.7% in C; p = .101, Fisher’s
exact test, two-sided).
We also do not find that subjects behave more
pro-socially toward their compatriots if nationality is non-salient in the dictator and ultimatum
game. In the dictator game, subjects give 3.35
tokens to compatriots (treatment C = 3.32). In the
ultimatum game, subjects offer 4.28 tokens to
compatriots in treatment NS (treatment C = 4.62)
and the minimal acceptable offer is 2.35 when

matched with a compatriot in NS (treatment
C = 3.13, p = .185, Mann–Whitney).
FINDING 1b: Nationality does not serve as a coordination device if nationality is non-salient. Subjects
are not more likely to try to coordinate on the payoffdominant equilibrium with someone from the same
nationality if they are provided with additional information about their partner.

The next question we address is whether subjects are less likely to choose a PDE action if they
know that their partner has a different nationality. We observe that 40.6% (39 out of 96) of the
participants choose B if they play with someone
from a different nationality in treatment S and
42.6% (29 out of 68) of the subjects choose B if
they play with someone from a different nationality in NS. These percentages are not different
from the percentage in treatment C (42.6%, χ2 ,
p > .776). The non-significant impact of coming
to know that the partner has a different nationality is also confirmed in Models 3 (for treatment
S) and 4 (for treatment NS) of Table 3 (p > .453).
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FIGURE 4
Choice of Pareto-dominant Equilibrium Action Depending on Treatment and Constellations of
Nationalities

Notes: S-JK: Treatment S, Japanese subject is paired with Korean; S-JC: Treatment S, Japanese subject is paired with Chinese;
NS-JK: Treatment NS, Japanese subject is paired with Korean; NS-JC: Treatment S, Japanese subject is paired with Chinese;
S-KJ: Treatment S, Korean subject is paired with Japanese; S-KC: Treatment S, Korean subject is paired with Chinese; NSKJ: Treatment NS, Korean subject is paired with Japanese; NS-KC: Treatment NS, Korean subject is paired with Chinese;
S-CJ: Treatment S, Chinese subject is paired with Japanese; S-CK: Treatment S, Chinese subject is paired with Korean; NS-CJ:
Treatment NS, Chinese subject is paired with Japanese; NS-CK: Treatment NS, Chinese subject is paired with Korean.

In Figure 3, we can observe that only a
low fraction of outcomes are payoff-dominant
(12.5%) when matched with someone from a different nationality in S. Moreover, 56.3% miscoordinate on the outcomes (8,1) or (1,8) in S
when matched with someone from a different
nationality, which is insignificantly higher than
in C (Fisher’s exact test, p = .164, two-sided).
Also in treatment NS, few outcomes are payoffdominant when matched with someone from a
different nationality (14.7%)—but this percentage is still higher than when matched with someone from the same nationality in NS (12.5%).
More than half of the subjects (55.9%) miscoordinate on the outcomes (8,1) and (1,8) which
is somewhat higher than in the control treatment
(40.7%, p = .192, two-sided, Fisher’s exact test)
but less than when matched with someone from
the same nationality in S (64.7%).

FINDING 2: Choice between payoff-dominant and
risk-dominant actions is the same in C and S/NS. That
is, knowing that the partner is of different nationality
does not affect the choices in coordination game as
compared to when nationality is unknown.

We conclude this section by investigating
the role of the constellations of nationalities.
Figure 4 provides an overview of the probability
of choosing B depending on the treatment and
the constellation of nationalities. The figure
shows some interesting, nationality specific
patterns. First, we observe that Japanese subjects, who seemed, according to Figure 2, not
to discriminate between compatriots and other
nationals, discriminate between Koreans (only
27.0% choose B when paired with a Korean
in treatment S) and Chinese (61.0%). Korean
subjects tend to be less likely to choose B when
the information about their partner’s nationality
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is non-salient as compared to when it is salient.
The opposite is true for Chinese, who tend to
be less likely to choose B when the information
about their partner’s nationality is salient. For
example, when a Chinese only knows about
his/her partner that he/she is Japanese (treatment
S), he/she chooses B with a probability of .28 as
compared to a probability of .50 when additional
information about the partner is available besides
his/her Japanese nationality (treatment NS).
Interestingly, in S and NS combined subjects
are quite unlikely to choose B if their partner is
Japanese and not a compatriot (35.7%). This percentage is lower than when the partner is Korean
(40.4%) or Chinese (48.2%). While these differences are not uniform and not statistically significant, the patterns are roughly consistent with
a contentious history of cross-national disagreements in the region.8 One may speculate that
both the Chinese and Korean subjects are biased
against the Japanese in response to the Japanese
imperialist policy and military occupations of
their nations in the past. Recent disputes over the
ownership of the islands in the East China Sea,
for example, are evidence that these regional tensions are not entirely a historical artifact.
V.

CONCLUSION

In this study, we experimentally test the relevance and scope of focal points when individuals make decisions under strategic uncertainty.
In a period marked by extensive cross-national
interactions, nationality may present an important focal point that individuals coordinate on.
What is the relevance and scope of nationality as a
coordination device? We recruited subjects from
three countries that heavily engage in international trade and let them play coordination games
in three treatments in which we manipulated the
information they receive about their partner.9
Our findings suggest that nationality can function as a coordination device but that the scope of
this device is limited. Subjects attempt to coordinate more on the PDE if their partner has the
8. Kuwabara et al. (2007) and Takshashi et al. (2008)
find similar nationality specific effects in their variant of trust
game between participants from Japan, China, and Taiwan
and suggest that culture-specific content (e.g., collective guilt
for WWII) may influence these national-level patterns.
9. According to the size of their exports China
ranks 2nd, Japan 4th, and Korea 12th. From 2000 to
2008, China has almost sixfolded, Japan and Korea have
more than doubled, their exports. Data from United
Nations Statistics Department available at http://unstats.
un.org/unsd/trade/imts/annual%20totals.htm.

same nationality and the information about the
partner’s nationality is salient. In addition, our
data suggest that the scope of nationality as a
coordination device is highly nationality specific
and provide suggestive evidence showing that
this difference is not a result of more pro-social
behavior toward compatriots, that is, in-group
favoritism. However, if the information about the
partners’ nationality is not salient, that is, nationality is only one of several other attributes which
subjects know about their partner, nationality
seems to be irrelevant for coordination. Moreover, overall we do not find in our study that
coordination is more difficult between partners of
different nationalities.
One possible explanation of these results may
lie in the dual nature of culture in this experiment. Nationality certainly constitutes an important part of one’s culture and identity, but it does
not represent the full extent of it. While being
nationals of three different countries, the subjects in this experiment are all students of the
University of Hawaii. They are united by a common university culture and international community. As the focus is diluted away from nationality in the non-salient treatment, common culture for university students may dominate and
hence the results on nationalities are weakened.
The dual nature of culture in our experiment may
also explain why we do not find significant ingroup favoritism in the dictator and ultimatum
games.10
More generally, one may speculate that the
scope of nationality as a coordination device is
limited because (1) interacting parties often have
access to more information about their partners
than only their nationality and (2) there is a probability that they share different cultural aspects.
On the other hand, our findings also suggest that
having more information about trading partners
may not necessarily be beneficial as it seems to
increase the risk of MIS. Moreover, our experimental results imply that coordination is not more
difficult between parties from different nationalities if subjects have more information about
their partners than only their nationality, as compared to the benchmark case when nationality is
unknown.
These results also contribute to the growing
cross-cultural literature and the economic literature on group identity. Our findings suggest
the necessity of conducting experiments that
10. Comparably, Buchan et al. (2009) find that globalization promotes cooperation.
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manipulate the salience of cultural and group
membership for testing the robustness of the
findings in the in- and out-group literature,
which use natural groups. Moreover, our findings point to the need of conducting additional
research to investigate the ultimate mechanism(s)
behind the PDE action. While we have learned
through our design that it is not simply in-group
favoritism that drives our nationality coordination
device finding, it would be interesting to better
understand the underlying rationale.
APPENDIX A. PRE-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE
1. What is your age? (Mean = 25.01, st. dev = 5.6)
2. Please indicate your gender
_____ Male (31.19%) _____ Female (68.81%)
3. What is your major at UH?
4. How long have you lived in the United States? (Mean =
3.71, st. dev = 4.74; 54.61% of subjects—<2 years)
5. Of which country are you currently a citizen? (Japanese
—34.4%, Korean—30.94%, Chinese—34.62%)
6. How strongly do you identify yourself with this country?
_____ Not at all (1.7%) _____ Somewhat (41.51%)
_____ Very strongly (56.79%)
7. Are you happy to identify yourself with this country?
_____ No (5.75%) _____ Somewhat (30.28%)
_____ Yes (69.72%)

1403

We will proceed to the decisions once the instructions are
clear. Are there any questions?

PART 1
In this part, you will be randomly matched with one other
participant. Their identity will not be revealed to you and
yours will not be revealed to them.
You will be assigned a role: Proposer or Responder. Your
role will remain the same for all three decisions in this part
and in the next.
Instructions to the PROPOSERS: A sum of 10 dollars has
been allocated to both of you. The proposer has to choose how
the money should be divided between you. The proposer’s
task is to choose an amount between 0 and 10 dollars to be
offered to the responder.
Instructions to the RESPONDERS: The responders will
not see the proposer’s offer. The responder’s task is to indicate the smallest amount which they will accept from the
proposer. If the proposer’s actual offer to the responder
is at least as large as the smallest offer that responder is
willing to accept, then the money is divided according to
the proposer’s offer. Otherwise, neither of you will receive
anything.
Your decisions during this experiment will remain anonymous and private and you will not know the outcome of the
decisions until the end of the experiment. You will be asked
to make three decisions in this part, and each time you will be
matched with a different person.
Any questions?

PART 2
APPENDIX B. EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS
TREATMENT C (CONTROL)
Welcome and thank you for your participation in the
economics experiment on decision making!
INTRODUCTION
Please note that you are not allowed to communicate with
each other during the experiment.
During this experiment you will participate in decision
tasks that give you the opportunity to earn money. All the
earnings in this experiment will be in dollars. Immediately
upon completion of the experiment, we will pay you your
game earnings in cash. Your earnings are confidential and you
will be paid in private.
This experiment will consist of several parts. In each
part, you will be asked to make three decisions which will
involve another participant with whom you will be randomly
matched. For every decision task, you will be randomly
matched with a different participant than in the previous
decision. Your decision may affect the payoffs of others, just
as the decisions of the person you are matched with may affect
your payoffs.
At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly choose one task from each part as the paid task.
The other tasks will remain unpaid. You will not be
informed of the results of any task until the end of the
experiment.

In this part, you will be matched with different participants
than before. You have not been matched with these people
before. You have been assigned the same role as in the
previous part (proposer or responder). The proposer has to
make a decision, while the responder has no decision to make
in this game. As before, you will not know the identity of the
person you are matched with.
Instructions to the Proposers: A sum of 10 dollars has been
allocated to the both of you. The proposer has to choose how
the money should be divided between you. The proposer’s
task is to choose an amount between 0 and 10 dollars to be
offered to the responder. The responder has no decision to
make in this game, so the money will be divided according
to the decision of the proposer.
You will be asked to make your decision three times,
and each time you will be matched with a different
person.
Please make your decision as prompted on the screen.

PART 3
In this part, you have been randomly matched with another
person. You have not been matched with this person before.
Both of you will make decisions at the same time and your
payoff in this part will depend on your decision as well as the
decision of the participant with whom you are matched. Their
identity will not be revealed to you.
Your task in this part is to choose either “A” or “B.”
Depending on your choice and the choice of your match,
your earnings will be the following:
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Other participant
A

B

A

7, 7

8, 1

B

1, 8

9, 9

You

• If you choose “A” and the other participant chooses “A”
then both of you receive $7 each
• If you choose “A” and the other participant chooses
“B” then you receive $8 and the other participant receives $1
• If you choose “B” and the other participant chooses
“B” then both of you receive $9 each
• If you choose “B” and the other participant chooses
“A” then you receive $1 and the other participant receives $8.
Now, please make your decision as prompted on the screen.

APPENDIX C. EXIT QUESTIONNAIRE

2. What is your major at UH? _____
3. What is your GPA? _____ (Mean = 3.26, st. dev = .69,
Max = 4)
4. How long have you been living in the United States?
________
(Mean = 3.71, st. dev = 4.74; 54.61% of subjects – less
than 2 years)
5. How easy to understand were the instructions?
________
_____ Difficult (33.68%) _____ Easy (66.32%)
6. [Only applicable to NS treatments] When making decisions in this experiment, you were matched with another
person. Which of their characteristics were most
important in your decision? __________
7. Do you have any friends participating in this session at
the same time with you?
_____ Yes _____ No
8. If you do have friends in this session with you, did that
affect your decisions in this experiment? _____ Yes
_____ No
9. Did you like the experiment? _____ Yes _____ No
10. Please add any additional comments you have about this
experiment:

1. What is your gender? _____ M (31.19%) _____ F
(68.81%)

APPENDIX D
TABLE A1
Published Research with Multi-game Experimental Design

Author(s)

Place and
Year of
Publication

Tomomi, Camerer,
and Nguen

AER, 2010

Charness, Karni,
and Levin

GEB, 2010

Rode

GEB, 2010

Charnes and
Villeval

AER, 2009

Exact Implementation of
Multi-game Design
(number of games,
payment strategy, etc.)
3 games: trust game (TG), risk and
time discounting. TG was
played first, but the outcomes
were not revealed to the
subjects until the end of the
session. Subjects were paid for
all 3 games
1–4 games: transparent test,
public goods (PG), winner’s
curse, and hidden information
and communication experiment.
Some sessions included
feedback and others did not
6 games/exercises: 4 math/general
knowledge contests,
coordination game or matching
pennies game, and
communication game
3 games: public goods, real-effort
competition game, and risk
aversion test. Subjects were
paid for all 3 games. Some
sessions included feedback and
others did not

Report Results
for all Games?

Find Order, Framing,
and Other Effects?

No. TG is not reported
in the study

No discussion of any
possible order or
framing effects

No. Only transparent
test is discussed

No discussion of any
possible effects.

Yes, but the analysis
focuses on the
communication
game

No discussion of any
possible effects

Yes

No discussion of any
possible effects,
except the “order”
variable in a
regression is found
to be insignificant
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TABLE A1
Continued

Author(s)

Place and
Year of
Publication

Chen and Li

AER, 2009

Botelho et al.

GEB, 2009

Corbae and Duffy

GEB, 2008

Charness and
Rabin

QJE, 2002

Henrich et al.

AER, 2001

Anderson,
Rodgers, and
Rodriguez

Economic
Letters,
2000

Exact Implementation of
Multi-game Design
(number of games,
payment strategy, etc.)

Report Results
for all Games?

24 games: variations of dictator
game (DG) followed by 16
response games (strategy
method). One random round
was chosen for payment in
each part. No outcome was
revealed until the end of the
experiment
2 games (in some sessions):
regular PG game and
“sanctions” PG game (with the
order reversed in some
sessions)
5–9 games depending on the
session: variations of stag-hunt
game. Subjects were paid for
all 3 games
2–8 games depending on the
session: 7 variations of DG and
20 response games. Subjects
who made 2–8 decisions were
paid for random 1 or 2 choices.
Role reversion and strategy
method with no feedback were
used
3 games: ultimatum game (UG)
dictator game (DG), and public
goods (PG) game
2 games: UG and DG (with
reversed order in some
treatments). Perfect stranger
design. Subjects were paid for
one randomly chosen part

Find Order, Framing,
and Other Effects?

Yes

No discussion of any
possible effects

No, the results of the
“sanctions” PG
game are not
discussed

No discussion of any
possible effects

Yes

No discussion of any
possible effects

Yes

No discussion of any
possible effects

Yes

No discussion of any
possible effects

Yes

Find order effects in
the United States,
but not in Honduras

APPENDIX E. ULTIMATUM AND DICTATOR GAME RESULTS
TABLE A1
Ultimatum and Dictator Game Behavior: Constellation of Nationalities in NS Treatment
Variable (mean, $)
Proposer’s share
In ultimatum game
Proposer’s share
In dictator game
Responder’s minimum
Acceptable offer

ja–ja

ja–ko

ja–ch

ko–ko

ko–ja

ko–ch

ch–ch

ch–ja

ch–ko

5.4
7
6.0
6
1.8
6

5.5
6
6.0
6
1.8
4

5.6
5
5.8
6
2.7
6

5.6
5
6.6
5
2.8
5

4.5
4
6.8
5
4.2
6

6.2
5
5.6
5
3.3
6

6.2
6
7.3
6
2.5
6

5.7
6
6.5
6
3.0
6

6.0
6
7.3
6
2.6
5

Notes: Numbers in italics show the respective number of observations. Ja–ko, for example, shows the mean decision of the
Japanese proposers matched with Korean responders, whereas ko–ja shows the mean decision of the Korean proposer matched
with a Japanese responder.
ja, Japanese; ch, Chinese; ko, Korean.
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TABLE A2
Ultimatum and Dictator Game Behavior: Constellation of Nationalities in S Treatment

Variable (mean, $)
Proposer’s share
In ultimatum game
Proposer’s share
In dictator game
Responder’s minimum
Acceptable offer

ja–ja

ja–ko

ja–ch

ko–ko

ko–ja

ko–ch

ch–ch

ch–ja

ch–ko

5.0
9
6.2
10
3.3
9

4.8
6
5.8
6
3.6
9

4.9
8
6.3
8
3.6
10

4.7
6
6.8
6
3.2
6

5.3
9
7.9
8
3.2
6

5.4
8
7.4
8
1.9
7

4.6
9
7.1
9
3.9
9

5.2
10
7.6
10
3.6
8

3.7
7
7.6
8
3.5
8

Notes: Numbers in italics show the respective number of observations. Ja–ko, for example, shows the mean decision of the
Japanese proposers matched with Korean responders, whereas ko–ja shows the mean decision of the Korean proposer matched
with a Japanese responder.
ja, Japanese; ch, Chinese; ko, Korean.
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